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NOTES
ON LINE FINANCIAL SERVICES: LIABILITY
FOR ERROR OR MALFUNCTION IN STOCK
TRANSACTIONS OVER PERSONAL
COMPUTERS
Scott R. Porter
I. INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGENCE OF FINANCIAL DATA
PROCESSING NETWORKS
Data communication networks have proliferated largely as a
result of the merging of data processing and communications tech-
nology. 1 Originally, access to these networks was limited to institu-
tions who could afford the large capital expenditures necessary to
purchase and maintain a computer. However, with the develop-
ment of the silicon chip and the ensuing production of the personal
computer, access to data communications networks is now available
on the consumer level.2 Commercial data-base vendors are ex-
panding beyond the traditional markets of government, university
libraries and large corporations - to sell information to individuals
and small businesses.3 The result is an information revolution.
Now, almost any computer can be connected to the phone system
and therefore can communicate with large databases. All that the
user needs is communications software and a modem, an inexpen-
sive piece of electronic hardware that converts the computer's digi-
tal signals into tones that can be carried over phone networks.'
While the benefits of such networks are obvious, increased con-
sumer reliance on these communications networks inevitably will
create legal problems. As data communication networks increas-
ingly are used to accomplish financial transactions, the potential for
Copyright © 1985 Scott Porter. All Rights Reserved.
1. Owen and Komarow, The Emerging Law of Data Communications Networks: Some
Thoughts on the Rights and Responsibilities of Service Users and Providers, 2 COMPUTER LAW
REPORTER 276 (Sept. 1983).
2. Conant, Cook, and Marbach, Cruising the Electronic Mall, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26,
1983 at 72.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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system error, malfunction and the resulting loss will increase corre-
spondingly.5 This potential for error in computer transmission may
result in enormous loss of funds and consequential damages.6 One
of the central legal questions surrounding such transactions is the
fair and practical allocation of liabilities between service providers
and users.
This Note focuses on the narrow issue of the liability of banks
which provide electronic stock transactions. In order to provide a
full range of financial services to their customers, many banks have
recently expanded their services to offer discount brokerage serv-
ices.7 In addition, many banks have begun to offer twenty four hour
a day home banking and other electronic financial services to per-
sonal computer users.' The combination of the bank's new role as a
discount broker and the availability of stock trading and other fi-
nancial transactions through electronic networks raises the issue of
liability allocation for errors and malfunctions in electronic stock
transactions.
After a brief discussion of the recent changes in banking law
which have allowed banks to expand their available financial serv-
ices into the discount brokerage field, this Note examines the elec-
tronic systems involved and the existing law governing the liability
of banks as service providers in this area. This Note points out the
inadequacy of existing legislation and suggests a policy for further
regulation in this field.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Entry of Banks Into the Discount Brokerage
Business
Several banks have recently entered or expressed their intent to
engage in discount brokerage activites.9 This action comes as
banks, in an effort to compete with other financial institutions, ex-
pand their services to meet the needs and demands of a growing
consumer market.10 The recent involvement of banks in discount
brokerage activities comes as a direct challenge to the general policy
5. Owen and Komarow, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Note, National Banks and the Brokerage Business The Comptroller's New Reading
Of The Glass-Stegall Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 1303 (1983)[hereinafter cited as National Banks].
8. Conant, Cook, and Marbach, supra note 2.
9. Note, A Banker's Adventures In Brokerland: Looking Through Glass--Stegall At
Discount Brokerage Services, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1498, 1500 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Banker's Adventures].
10. Garcia, Shopping The New Financial Supermarkets, 2 CAL. LAW. 74 (Sept. 1982).
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of federal banking law to keep investment banking separate from
commercial activities. The Comptroller of the Currency has tradi-
tionally opposed any enlargement of the scope of banking activities
on the grounds that depositor's investments should be protected by
keeping banks from activities which would place these investments
at too great a risk."'
In contrast to this policy, the Comptroller recently granted
permission for two banks to enter the discount brokerage business
through separately incorporated subsidiaries. 2 In so doing, the
Comptroller approved in principle, the direct involvement of banks
in the discount brokerage business.'3 This decision marks a loosen-
ing of the traditional policies which have barred banks from enter-
ing the securities industry. Although there is opposition to this
expansion from the Securities Industry Association,' 4 the continued
involvement of banks in the discount brokerage business seems as-
sured.' 5 The result is that banks are now beginning to offer securi-
ties trading in addition to their other services.
B. The Nature of Financial Data Networks
Apart from the changes in the policies regulating the scope of
banking transactions, changes are also taking place in the technical
way in which these transactions are carried out. Many banks have
recently extended their services to include the processing of finan-
cial transactions through electronic tellers and customer's personal
computers. The following is a brief description of the electronic
networks which banks are using to provide these services.
Financial data networks provide information through tele-
phone lines for use on an end-user's personal computer. Informa-
tion initially is gathered by the financial service provider and
programmed into a large central computer. The information then is
transmitted through telephone networks and is decoded and
processed by a user's computer. Some systems provide only a one
way flow of information, from the source to the end user.'6 The
11. The Comptroller of the Currency is the federal authority that regulates national
banks. See National Banks, supra note 7, at 1306-13.
12. Id. at 1316.
13. Id. at 1317.
14. Id. at 1322.
15. "By the end of 1982 over a hundred banks had, either directly or indirectly entered
the brokerage business." Id. at 1315.
16. An example of such a system is "Huttonline," offered by E.F. Hutton. This system
provides stock prices and other financial information to investors. See Steidtmann, Brokerage
Firms Go On Line, PC WORLD, March 1984, at 232.
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ability of newer computers to receive and process several signals
simultaneously, has led to interactive systems which provide two
way communication between the service provider and the end user.
Several users are now able to go "on line" with the central com-
puter at the same time. The result is a star shaped network, 17 the
center of which is the service provider, in this case the bank, and at
the several points are the end users, the investors.
Home computers used in conjunction with financial telecom-
munications networks have made possible increasingly more com-
plex financial management in the home." Checks, notes, and cash
payments are increasingly being replaced by data stream transac-
tions. Paper records of the transactions only serve as evidence of a
transfer accomplished entirely through electronic means.
All home banking transactions on personal computers, are
known as "electronic funds transfers" (EFT) and are regulated by
the 1978 Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA).19 While there are
many restrictions on the services which may be offered by banks
through EFT systems,20 the benefits of such services are generally
recognized and the trend is toward the expansion of EFT services.21
As a result of the recent entry of banks into the discount brokerage
business, one of the services which many banks have begun to offer
recently is electronic stock trading.2
Electronic stock transactions are similar in many respects to
other home banking transactions. The end-user initially goes on
line with the bank/broker by opening an account. The user then
places his orders through his personal computer by entering the
stock symbol and an order to buy or sell. This order is then trans-
mitted to the bank/broker, and then directly to the trading floor for
execution. Once the transaction has been completed, the user re-
ceives a confirmation over the screen, and later receives written con-
17. Control Of And Access To On Line Computer Data Bases, 5 CoMM/ENT 1, 7
(1982).
18. "The fledgling information utilities are hoping to cash in on a much larger market.
One of the sure bets will likely be financial services- stock quotes, financial data, and news."
Conant, Cook, and Marbach, supra note 2. These services include payments and transfer of
funds, as well as point of sale transactions. See Banking By Blip, 69 A.B.A.J. 263 (1982), see
also Raysman and Brown, EFT and Duty of Care, 199 N.Y.L.J. 1, col. I (1982).
19. Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1978).
20. See Banking By Blip, supra note 18.
21. The Federal Reserve Board in August 1982 amended Regulation Y relating to bank
holding companies, allowing them to expand their permissible data processing activities.
That action followed approval of an application by Citicorp to engage in data processing and
data transmission activities through its subsidiary, Citishare. Id.
22. Regarding the entry of banks into the discount brokerage service, see supra notes
10-16 and accompanying text.
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firmation in the mail. The total time for an electronic stock trade is
usually less than three minutes.23 Billing is done either through a
credit card, or through the transfer of funds from another account.
In addition to providing stock transactions, the service usually of-
fers tax records maintenance, and automatic portfolio management.
An investor may also place an order to buy or sell a stock automati-
cally if that stock reaches a certain price.24
In the immediate future, banks offering discount brokerage
services will become the main providers of electronic stock trading.
The appeal of discount brokerages is that their direct order entry
cuts the salesman out and obviates the need for a full service bro-
ker.25 As many banks are rapidly entering the discount brokerage
business and already have the systems available to offer home bank-
ing, it is certain that most banks will offer electronic stock trading.
With this new service will come a potential liability in an area
where regulation is insufficient and existing law is unclear.
III. CuRRENT BANK LIABILITY IN ELECTRONIC STOCK
TRANSACTIONS
Electronic stock transactions, like other electronic financial
transactions, are subject to error and system malfunction.26 Error
involves accounting or arithmetic errors, incorrect or unauthorized
transactions, and failure to enter transactions that were properly
conveyed to the bank/broker.2 7 System malfunction occurs when
an electronic transaction system fails to operate properly.28 System
malfunctions may produce errors, delay in transactions, or failure
to accomplish the desired transaction. The slightest error or system
malfunction could result in a substantial loss of profits and conse-
quential damages to the investor.
An example illustrates the potential problems. A user opens
an account with his bank and signs on with its full service home
banking and discount brokerage service. He initially places an or-
der to buy 1000 shares of IBM stock which is selling at $110 a
share. His initial investment is $110,000. The user then places an
23. Broker's Links To Homes Can Transform The Industry, WALL STREET COMPUTER
REVIEW, Nov.-Dec. 1983 at 9.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. NAT'L COMM. ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, EFT IN THE UNITED STATES;
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, at 55 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
FINAL REPORT].
27. Id.
28. Id.
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order to sell the stock if at any time it increases to $120. The user
specifies that the order continue subject only to his express cancella-
tion. The user immediately receives confirmation of his order on his
computer screen, and later receives written confirmation by mail.
Subsequently the user leaves town on a business trip. While he
is away, IBM announces plans to build a new computer and its
stock increases to $125. However, due to error or system malfunc-
tion, the bank fails to sell the user's stock. Before the user returns,
IBM stock returns to $110. When the user returns from his travels,
expecting to find a $15,000 profit, he is disappointed to learn that
his order has not been executed. Upon notifying the bank he finds
that his order was not placed because of a "computer malfunction."
Frustrated and dissatisfied, the user files suit seeking $15,000 lost
profits.
Assuming that both the user's computer and the telephone net-
work operated properly and that the failure to complete the order in
fact was due to error by the bank or computer malfunction, the
question arises as to what extent the bank is liable for the lost prof-
its. There is no clear answer. Because of the relatively recent entry
of banks into the discount brokerage service, and the rapid techno-
logical developments which allow banks to offer electronic stock
trading, the law which applies to this area has not been defined.
Although the EFTA regulates electronic fund transfers by
banks,29 it is questionable whether this Act also applies to electronic
stock transactions by banks. If EFTA is not applicable, then alloca-
tion of liability between banks and end users will rest on traditional
common law contract principles.30 This section examines the possi-
ble application of EFTA to electronic stock transactions, the regula-
tion of discount brokers by the Securities Exchange Commission
and the National Association of Securities Dealers, and finally turns
to the common law to resolve proper liability allocation between
banks and customers in electronic funds transfers.
A. Liability Under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act
In 1978 Congress enacted the Federal Electronic Funds Trans-
fer Act, EFTA.3 1 This Act is concerned almost exclusively with
29. See supra note 19.
30. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has already been held not to apply to cer-
tain EFT situations. See Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d
1047 (2d Cir. 1979) (While recognizing that some UCC provisions might apply by analogy,
the UCC was held not to apply to interbank transfer of funds for commercial purposes be-
cause the Code does not specifically address the problems of electronic funds transfers.).
31. Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (Supp. II 1978).
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transactions which involve individual consumers and banks. All
transfers of funds through automatic teller machines, point of sale
machines and home banking through home computers are regulated
by this act.32 In general, the Act is a consumer protection law
designed to protect the individual user from error attributable to his
bank.33
EFTA most likely does not apply to electronic stock transac-
tions by banks acting as discount brokers.34  While the Act ex-
pressly applies to electronic funds transfers, an electronic funds
transfer is defined as "any transfer of funds . . . which is initiated
through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument or computer
. ..so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to
debit or credit an account. ' 35 The Act specifically states however,
that the term "electronic fund transfer" expressly excludes any
transaction the primary purpose of which is the purchase or sale of
securities or commodities through a broker dealer registered with or
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.36  Banks
acting as discount brokers are neither registered with nor regulated
by the Securities Exchange Commission, therefore EFTA may be
applied directly to electronic stock transactions. Direct application
is unlikely however, because it is clear that the drafters of EFTA
did not intend that it should apply in such situations.37
But, even if EFTA is not applied directly, it is likely that its
standards will be applied by analogy. The legislative history of the
32. (6) [Tfhe term "electronic fund transfer" means any transfer of funds, other
than a transaction originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is
initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer or mag-
netic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit
an account. Such term includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, auto-
mated teller machine transactions, direct deposits or withdrawal of funds, and trans-
fers initiated by telephone ....
15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(6).
33. "(b) It is the purpose of this subchapter to provide a basic framework estab-
lishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund
transfer systems. The primary objective of this subehapter, however, is the provision
of individual consumer rights."
15 U.S.C. § 1693(b).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)6).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(6)(c).
36. "Mhe term 'electronic fund transfer'. . . does not include: (C) any transaction the
primary purpose of which is the purchase or sale of securities through a broker-dealer regis-
tered with the Securities and Exchange Commission." 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)(6)(C). Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, banks are excluded from the definition of broker. As a
result, banks are not subject to the same regulatory scheme promulgated and enforced by the
Securities Exchange Commission. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)
(1976). See also Banker's Adventures, supra note 9, at 1528.
37. Id.
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Act states that one of its purposes was to assure that all electronic
financial transactions would be subject to the same standards.3"
The legislative history also indicates that the definition of electronic
funds transfer was intended to give the Federal Reserve Board flexi-
bility in determining whether new or developing electronic services
should be covered by the Act.39
Although it initially appears that electronic stock transactions
were not intended to be regulated under EFTA, such transactions
involve many of the same procedures as electronic funds transfers
and so are likely to create similar types of problems. In determining
whether EFTA should apply to a particular activity, one of the cri-
teria suggested by the drafters was whether current laws provide
adequate consumer safeguards." Since there are no consumer safe-
guards yet for electronic stock trading, it is reasonable to assume
that courts may apply the standards of EFTA- either directly or
by analogy- to disputes involving electronic stock transactions.
The liability of a bank for error or system malfunction is set
out in section 1693 of EFrA. I Under this section, a bank is liable
for all actual damages proximately caused by its failure to transfer
38. S. REp. No. 95-915, 95th Cong. reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
9403, 9410-1411.
39. Id. at 9411.
40. Id. at 9411.
41. Section 1693h reads as follows:
§ 1693h Liability of Financial Institutions
ACTION OR FAILURE TO ACT PROXIMATELY CAUSING DAMAGES
(a) Subject to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a financial institution
shall be liable to a consumer for all damages proximately caused by-
(1) the financial institution's failure to make an electronic fund transfer,
in accordance with the terms and conditions of an account, in the correct
amount or in a timely manner when properly instructed to do so by the
consumer except where-
(A) the consumer's account has insufficient funds
(B) the funds are subject to legal process or other encumbrance re-
stricting such transfer;
(C) such transfer would exceed an established credit limit;
(D) an electronic terminal has insufficient cash to complete the trans-
action; or
(E) as otherwise provided in the regulations of the board;
(2) the financial institution's failure to make an electronic fund transfer
due to insufficient funds when the financial institution failed to credit, in
accordance with the terms and conditions of an account, a deposit of
funds to the consumer's account which would have provided sufficient
funds to make the transfer, and
(3) the financial institution's failure to stop payment of a preauthorized
transfer from a customer's account when instructed to do so in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the account.
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the correct amount of funds, or failure to transfer funds in a timely
manner.42 The bank similarly would be liable for damages due to
any technical malfunction, unless the user knew of the malfunction
at the time he attempted to make the transfer.43 The effect of sec-
tion 1693 is to impose strict liability on the bank for direct damages
caused as a result of error or malfunction in the bank's system.44
Returning to the example of the user who purchased the IBM stock,
assuming EFTA were applicable, the bank would then be liable for
the $15,000 lost profits.
B. Potential Regulation of Banks by the Securities Exchange
Commission and National Association of Securities
Dealers
Thus far, banks have entered the discount brokerage business
only through subsidiaries and holding companies.45  Recent deci-
sions by the Comptroller of the Currency, however, seemingly ap-
prove the direct national bank entry into the field of discount
brokerage.46 The brokerage business is an area traditionally regu-
lated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). It is not clear,
however, if banks are subject to the same regulations as brokers.
Banks specifically are excluded from the definition of "broker"
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4' Consequently, banks are
not subject to the regulatory scheme promulgated and enforced by
ACTS OF GOD AND TECHNICAL MALFUNCTIONS
(b) A financial institution shall not be liable under subsection (a)(1) or (2)
of this section if the financial institution shows by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that its action or failure to act resulted from-
(1) an act of God or other circumstances beyond its control, that it exer-
cised reasonable care to prevent such an occurrence, and that it exercised
such diligence as the circumstances required; or
(2) a technical malfunction which was known to the customer at the time
he attempted to initiate an electronic fund transfer or, in the case of a
preauthorized transfer, at the time the transfer should have occurred.
INTENT
(c) In the case of failure described in subsection (a) of this section which
was not intentional and which resulted from a bona fide error, notwithstanding
the maintenance of such procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such er-
ror, the financial institution shall be liable for actual damages proved.
42. Even where the action or failure to act was a bona fide error, and the bank used
reasonable procedures to avoid this error, the bank will be liable for the actual damage suf-
fered by the user. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(h) (c).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(h)(b)(2).
44. S. REP. No. 95-915, supra note 38, at 9431.
45. National Banks, supra note 7, at 1322-1323.
46. Id. at 1317.
47. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(4) (1976).
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the SEC.4 8 Several commentators have suggested that this exemp-
tion may result in the inadequate protection of investors.49 so Re-
cently, the SEC has proposed legislation which would subject banks
engaging in securities activities to the full range of regulation by the
SEC.51 The effect would be to regulate banks' liability for error in
securities transactions in the same way that brokers are currently
regulated.52 As such, it is important to examine current regulatory
schemes creating liability for brokers' errors or failures to complete
securities transactions.
The stated purpose of broker regulation under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 was to "protect the public and investors
against malpractice in the securities and financial markets."5" Its
provisions primarily were designed to bring integrity to the trading
of securities by eliminating undesirable practices, such as fraud and
mismanagement, and thereby protect the public. 4 To achieve these
ends, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) was empowered
to regulate all broker-dealers directly. 55
The task of directly regulating all broker-dealers soon proved
to be too onerous for the SEC and accordingly, Congress amended
the SEA in 1938 to allow regulation by permitted qualified associa-
tions.5 6 These self-regulatory associations were to promulgate rules
48. Banks are not required to register as brokers with the SEC and so are exempt from
the elaborate reporting requirements involved in registration. See N. Wolfson, R. Phillips, &
T. Russo, Regulation of Brokers, Dealers and Securities Markets, 1 I.01-.21. Banks also do
not face the choice of either registering with the National Association of Securities Dealers,
(NASD) or submitting to comparable regulation by the SEC. Id., at 12.03.
49. See Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91 BANKING L. J. 611, 614
(1974) (SEC commissioner noting lack of investor protection); Securities Industry Associa-
tion, Bank Securities-Activities, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 751, 790, ("Among the standards
and safeguards inapplicable to banks and unavailable to their brokerage customers, are those
relating to... prompt execution").
50. Applicability of Broker-Dealer Registration to Banks, 17 CFR Part 240, Release No.
34-20357, File No. S7-1000 (proposed 1983 amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, broker liability for
error was determined entirely under common law tort and contract rules. These rules remain
as a possible alternative to statutory regulation and will be discussed in the next section. See
infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
54. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3016.
55. SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcURmIES MARKETS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st sess., pt.
2 at 541 (1963).
56. These self regulatory associations are to promulgate rules which meet SEC stan-
dards, and are required to discipline members who violate these rules. Securities Exchange
Act 15 U.S.C. § 780(3) (1976).
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which met SEC standards, and to discipline members who violated
these rules. The only association yet to be registered in this capac-
ity is the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(NASD).5 7 In order to assure uniformity, the SEA was again
amended in 1964 to give the SEC broader powers to alter or supple-
ment NASD rules, as well as the power to review or set aside ac-
tions of the NASD.58 The result has been an "uneasy balance" of
regulation between the SEC and the NASD. 9
1. Regulation by the Securities Exchange Commission
An evaluation of the liability of broker error begins with a fo-
cus on regulation under the SEA. Although the SEA was enacted
to protect investors, its primary concern is the integrity of broker-
dealers.' ° Accordingly, the main focus of the act is on disclosure
and anti-fraud provisions; broker error and negligence are not di-
rectly addressed. This focus leaves the investor very limited in his
avenues of recovery under the SEA. In order to recover his lost
profits or damages, the investor must demonstrate that the broker's
error constituted fraud. There are two possible theories which
might allow recovery under the anti-fraud provision of SEA rule
1Ob-5. 6
1
First, the investor may allege that the broker's error consti-
tuted a breach of fiduciary duty to the investor. In addition, the
burden is on the investor to prove that he acted in reliance on the
broker's advice and that he placed such confidence in that advice
that there was no arms-length transaction.62 While this is applica-
ble to full-service brokers who manage an investor's portfolio, it is
hardly applicable to a discount broker who merely processes orders
for a customer - especially when orders are placed entirely
through a computer. Since there is little, if any, verbal communica-
tion between the broker and the investor, it would be impossible to
show either (1) that a fiduciary duty existed, or (2) that the broker
had knowledge that his error constituted fraud.
57. The membership of the NASD includes virtually all broker dealers engaged in the
general securities business. See Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-The-Counter Se-
curities Markets, Implied Liabilites Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORN. L.Q. 633, 634 (1965).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (k)(15)(a).
59. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS, A GUIDE TO THE REGU-
LATORY PROCESS (1977) at S.
60. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (1961) at 1500.
61. In both cases, the investor must show that the broker breached a duty and in so
doing made an intentiQnal misrepresentation. The difficulty comes in showing "scienter,"
knowledge on the part of the broker. Id.
62. Haley & Co., 37 S.E.C. 100, 106 (1956).
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Secondly, an investor may assert that a broker was negligent in
processing his order and that such negligence triggers the lOb-5
anti-fraud provision. The Supreme Court however, has specifically
held that mere negligence is not sufficient to sustain a cause of ac-
tion under lOb-5.63 While "recklessness" has been held in some ju-
risdictions to trigger a lOb-5 cause of action," recklessness is
measured by the severity of the misconduct and generally requires
willful disregard.65 A broker's mere failure to place an order proba-
bly would not constitute such recklessness, and thus the investor
would be unable to maintain an action for fraud.
In sum, there is no real protection for the investor in comput-
erized stock transactions with a discount broker under the SEA.
2. Regulation by the National Association of Securities
Dealers
Apart from SEA regulations, a broker may be liable under the
Rules of Fair Practice as enacted and enforced by the NASD.66
The standards for business conduct of a broker are set forth in Arti-
cle III and require that a member shall observe both the high stan-
dards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of
trade.6 While this provides general principles for conduct, a fur-
ther section regulating books and records provides that each mem-
ber shall keep and preserve accurate books, accounts, records,
memoranda, and correspondence in conformity with the rules of the
NASD.6 s
In maintaining proper records under the NASD rules, a broker
is charged with a duty to use reasonable care to maintain records so
that everyday operations are not impaired.69 The fact that record
keeping functions actually may be performed by another party does
not relieve the broker of liability.70 If these rules were applied to
error in electronic securities transactions, the broker bank would be
liable for all electronic orders not properly recorded and completed.
Unfortunately, with only rare exceptions,the NASD rules do
63. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
64. See Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Coleco Industries Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978).
65. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
66. NASD RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE, Art. I, p. 2001 et seq., (CCH 1981).
67. Id., Business Conduct of Members, Art. III, 12151, § 1.
68. Id., Books and Records, Art. III, 1 2171, § 21.
69. Madison Management Corp. and Harry Friedman, SEC Release No. 34-7453
(1964).
70. rd.
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not provide for private causes of action.71 While the NASD as a
self-regulatory agency is set up by brokers to create rules of conduct
and to discipline members who fail to meet those standards, the
focus of the NASD is not specifically to protect the investing pub-
liec. 72 Rather, the purpose of the NASD is to professionalize the
securities industry and to benefit that industry.73
Although in a few instances, private causes of action have been
allowed for violations of NASD rules, the general trend is away
from an expansion of such fights. Accordingly, while the NASD
rules allow public investors to file complaints which may trigger an
investigation of the broker, the penalty for misconduct will gener-
ally be a fine and/or suspension of the broker.74 Thus, while the
NASD potentially sets up rules for broker liabilty for computer er-
ror, in reality there is generally no recovery for an aggrieved inves-
tor. Thus, in the example cited above, the frustrated user might be
able to see that the broker is reprimanded, but he would be unable
to recover his $15,000 lost profits.
C. Liability Under Common Law
1. Broker Liability
Prior to the enactment of the SEA, a broker's liability was de-
termined entirely by contract principles. These principles remain
an alternative theory of recovery for error or malfunction in elec-
tronic stock transactions. It has long been recognized that a broker
is liable for damages to an investor resulting from failure to
purchase or sell as ordered unless performance is waived by the in-
vestor,75 or the failure to act occurs through no fault of the
broker.76
The law in this area is sparse, however, two cases are specifi-
cally on point. In Wotkyns v. Win. R. Staats Co.,77 an investor con-
tracted with his broker to sell 50 shares of stock if the stock reached
a specified price. In the two months following the receipt of this
71. For a study of these exceptions see Comment, Implied Civil Liability Arising From
Violation of the Rules of The National Association of Securities Dealers, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
151 (1975).
72. Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (1983).
73. Id. at 1382.
74. NASD RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE, Penalties for Violations of the Rules, Art. V,
2301, § 1, supra note 66.
75. See Kryl v. Pierce, 6 N.E.2d 521, 289 Ill. App. 10 (1937).
76. White v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 218 A.2d 655, 90 N.J. Super.
565 (1966) (Investor could not recover for broker's failure to rescind order when, on the day
after order was filled, trading in corporation's securities was suspended.).
77. Wotkys v. Wm. R. Staats, 8 Cal. App. 545, 47 P.2d 748 (1935).
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order, the stock reached the price several times, nevertheless the
broker failed to sell the shares.78 The investor subsequently sued,
and the court held the broker liable for failure to sell. The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals specifically found that there was no waiver on
the part of the investor, and that the measure of damages for such
breach of contract was the difference between the market price of
the securities at the date when the broker promised to sell them,
and the market price at the time later, when the customer reason-
ably should have taken affirmative steps to mitigate his own loss.79
In a similar action, a broker was ordered by an investor to sell
certain shares held in an account.8" The broker failed to sell at the
time the order was placed, and later sold at a substantially lower
price resulting in a loss to the investor. The investor brought suit.
The Illinois Court of Appeals held, as a well settled rule, that a
customer who has a margin account with a broker at any time may
order the sale of the securities in his account, and if the broker fails
to sell on such a direction the broker is liable for the resulting loss.81
The measure of damages in this case was the difference between the
price of the shares at the time the sale was ordered, and the price at
the time the sale was completed. 2
The effect of applying these principles to electronic stock trans-
actions would be to place the liability for lost profits on the bank/
broker if the investor could prove (1) that he placed an order with
the bank, (2) that the bank failed to act upon it, and (3) that such
failure resulted in lost profits to the investor. The bank would have
a defense if it could prove that the investor waived his enforcement
rights or that the failure to act was due to computer malfunction
beyond the bank's control.8 3
Under common law, in the case of the user who purchased the
IBM stock, the bank would be liable for the lost $15,000 if the in-
vestor could show that he placed an order which the bank failed to
process and the bank would have a defense if it could show that the
computer had malfunctioned through no fault of its own.
2. Bank Liability Under Negotiated Service Contracts
The second area of contract law which might be applied to er-
78. Id. at 547.
79. Id. at 549.
80. See Kryl v. Pierce, 6 N.E.2d 521, 289 Iil. App. 10 (1937).
81. Id. at 525 (citing Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N.Y. 235; Knowlton v. Fitch, 52 N.Y.
288).
82. Id. at 525.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 76, 77.
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ror or malfunction in electronic stock transactions relates to elec-
tronic fund transfers by banks which are not regulated by EFTA.
In contrast to the statutory scheme provided for the consumer
under EFTA, there is no legislation which regulates banks elec-
tronic fund transfers at the commercial level. 4  As a result, an
individual bank must contractually address questions of liability
when agreeing to electronically transfer funds for businesses. Evra
Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp. 15 sets forth some basic principles regard-
ing bank liability for error or system malfunction where service is
subject to the terms of a negotiated contract.
In Evra, a Chicago scrap dealer chartered a ship for two years
at a fixed rate with semimonthly payments. The payments were to
be made periodically by an electronic transfer of funds to the ship-
owner's bank in Switzerland. Because of rising charter rates, the
shipowner was eager to cancel the contract.8 6 When a default arose
because Swiss Bank failed to comply with the wire order to transfer
funds, the shipowner proceeded to cancel the contract.8 7 The scrap
dealer sued the bank for over $2 million in lost profits due to the
contract cancellation.
The court found that Swiss Bank had inadequate safeguards to
prevent the loss or the mishandling of messages received, and addi-
tionally, that Swiss Bank was aware that its safeguards were inade-
quate. Nevertheless, on appeal the court held that the bank's
liability did not extend to the lost profits. The court stated that
"electronic funds transfers are not so unusual as to automatically
place a bank on notice of extraordinary consequences if such a
transfer goes awry."" The court reasoned that the bank simply did
not have enough information to foresee the consequences of its fail-
ure to process the payment. Applying the rule of Hadley v. Bax-
endale,89 the court held that only foreseeable damages can be
recovered on a showing of negligence and that unforeseeable conse-
quential damages are not recoverable for the negligent handling of
electronic funds transfers. 0
84. See supra note 30.
85. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
86. Id. at 953.
87. The specific error which caused the failure was not determined, but the possibilities
included: 1) the telex machine at Swiss Bank was out of paper, so the telex machine was
unable to reprint the payment order, 2) whoever received the telex failed to deliver it to the
banking department. It was noted however, that the telex machine did signal that it had
received the message. Id. at 953.
88. Id. at 956.
89. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
90. Evra 673 F.2d at 958.
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The effect of this decision is to allow the parties to contractu-
ally allocate liabilty, and, in the absence of a contract, to protect
the bank from liability for unforeseeable consequential damages.
However, lost profits resulting from error or malfunction in elec-
tronic stock transactions are actual or direct damages, which flow
proximately from the failure to complete the transaction and are
foreseeable at the time that the order was placed. The bank is con-
stantly on notice of the amount of damages which will occur as a
result of its failure to act.
Accordingly, if the above contract principles are applied to
electronic stock transactions, banks will limit their liability for error
and malfunction in the original service contract.91 A similar limita-
tion of liability has long been recognized in the area of common
carriers- such as telephone and telegraph companies. 92 For exam-
ple, in one case a man delivered $200 to Western Union with in-
structions to transmit the money to a friend who was to bet the
money in a horserace.93 Western Union failed to deliver the money
in time to place the bet. The horse won, and the man was deprived
of $1450 winnings. When the man sought to recover from the
Western Union, the court held that the telegraph company had no
notice or knowledge of the purpose for which the money was being
transmitted, and so was only liable for the charges made in trans-
mitting the telegram.9 4
Unlike the telegram case, in electronic stock transactions it is
apparent exactly how the funds are to be used and the damages that
will result from an error or malfunction on the part of the bank.
IV. ACTIONS FOR ERROR OR MALFUNCTION IN ELECTRONIC
STOCK TRANSACTIONS
The applicable law in the emerging field of electronic stock
91. Limitations of liability in financial service contracts and network contracts are com-
mon. Such limitations are generally upheld on the grounds that the industry cannot foresee
all the possible risks involved in providing such a service, and therefore must be able to limit
their liability so that they may continue to provide a necessary service to all consumers.
Limitations are also upheld on the grounds that the risks have been fairly allocated between
the parties. The consumer is generally obligated to accept these limitations if he wishes to use
the service. See Owen and Komarow, supra note I at 278.
92. "In the absence of gross negligence or willful misconduct. . . telecommunications
carriers may limit their liability so long as the limiting tariff provisions are not shown to be
unjust or unreasonable." Memo Opinion and Order, In the Matter of Certified Financial
Consultants Corp., F.C.C. File No. E-82-4 (1982) at 3 (citing American Satellite Corp. v.
Southwestern Bell, 64 F.C.C. 2d 503, 510 (1977)).
93. Siegel v. Western Union Tel. Co., 37 N.E.2d 868, 312 Ill. App. 86 (1941).
94. Id.
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transactions is unclear. Accordingly, an attorney faced with the
challenge of recovering for loss due to error or malfunction must
first show what law applies to electronic stock transactions, and
then prove the bank's liability. The attorney will want to assert a
basis of liability which most favors his client's position. It is sug-
gested that an attorney should first argue that the bank is strictly
liable under the standards of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. If
he is unable to convince the court that EFTA applies, either directly
or by analogy, he may thereafter argue that the bank is liable under
contract principles.
A. Strict Liability Under EFTA
It initially appears that electronic stock transfers were not in-
tended to be regulated under the EFTA.9" A bank faced with the
threat of strict liability will inevitably argue that EFTA does not
apply. As noted previously, EFTA expressly excludes any transac-
tion the primary purpose of which is the purchase or sale of securi-
ties or commodities through a broker dealer registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. However, EFTA does not
foreclose the possibility of recovery for bank error or malfunction as
it only excludes from its coverage the sale of securities regulated by
the Securities Exchange Commission.96 Since banks are neither reg-
istered with nor regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission,
electronic stock transactions made through banks should not be ex-
cluded from regulation under EFTA.97 Additionally, the coverage
of EFTA specifically was intended to be flexible in order to allow
the application of uniform standards to new or developing elec-
tronic financial transactions.9" As electronic stock transactions are
both new and developing, EFTA should be extended to cover error
or malfunction within this emerging field.
A second argument for the application of EFTA to electronic
stock transactions is the factual similarity between these transac-
tions and electronic funds transfers. 99 In both situations the rela-
tionship of the bank to the service user is similar. Unlike stock
transactions through full service brokerages, which involve a great
amount of interaction between the investor and the broker, elec-
tronic stock transactions through banks involve little, if any, inter-
95. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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action between the bank and the investor. The investor, in placing
an order electronically, relies upon the bank to process the order.
Although there is on-screen as well as written confirmation of an
order, it is unlikely that there will be any verbal communication
between the bank and the investor after the initial service contract is
signed. Once the investor receives confirmation, he must assume
that his order has been placed.
This lack of interaction between user and bank, and user reli-
ance on bank systems was foreseen by the drafters of EFTA.10 Ac-
cordingly, the drafters specifically addressed the issue of the parties
rights in electronic transactions which involved little or no verbal
communication between the customer and the financial institu-
tion.101 The factual similarity of electronic stock transactions and
electronic funds transfers, and the fact that the drafters of the
EFTA specifically recognized the unique relationship between the
bank and the customer, together provide further support for the ex-
tension of EFTA to error or malfunction in electronic stock
transactions.
In addition, the application of EFTA to electronic stock trans-
actions properly would place the burden of proof on the bank to
defend its handling of the transaction."2 EFTA imposes this bur-
den on the bank because of the presumption that damages due to
bank error in funds transfers were clearly foreseeable at the time the
parties entered into the contract. 0 3 Similarly, in bank errors in-
volving electronic stock transactions, the investor will inevitably
suffer losses which were specifically within the contemplation of the
parties at the time they entered into the service contract. Thus, a
presumption may be made that actual damages will result from
bank error in electronic stock transactions and accordingly, the bur-
den of proof should be shifted to the bank, as in EFTA.
100. S. REP. No. 95-915, 95TH CONG., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 9403.
101. Id. at 9405.
102. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
103. The principle has been applied to wrongful dishonor of checks under U.C.C. § 4-
402 (1977). When a bank wrongfully dishonors its customer's business cheek there arises a
presumption that the customer's credit and business standing is thereby harmed. The func-
tion of this presumption is to remove from the customer the duty of going forward with the
evidence on this particular injury or harm and thereby avoid a directed verdict against him if
evidence on the issue is not produced. The primary reason for the recognition of this pre-
sumption is that a wrongful dishonor renders the existence of some harm to the customer's
credit and business standing so probable that it makes legal sense to assume the existence of
such harm unless and until the adversary comes forward with some evidence to the contrary.
American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 252 N.E.2d 839, 845-6 (Ind. App. 1969).
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A final argument in applying EFTA to stock transaction losses
due to system error or malfunction is the unequal ability of the par-
ties to bear the loss. The drafters of EFTA felt that where a bank
made an error in an electronic fund transfer, it should be liable for
the loss. While recognizing that such an imposition might raise the
price of overall EFT services, the drafters felt that such increase
would be negligible and that because of its ability to distribute this
liability cost to all users the bank was in a better position to bear the
loss than a single investor. This rationale applies with equal force
to electronic stock transactions. 04
If EFTA is not applied to electronic stock transactions, liabil-
ity will be determined by common law contract principles. The
bank, having a greater bargaining position, inevitably will include
provisions which will limit or deprive the user of rights in the event
of error or malfunction. As these disclaimers of liability and waiv-
ers of rights are available under contract principles,105 the only ef-
fective way to create cost spreading is to legislate bank liability.
Since the bank is better able to bear the loss attributable to error or
malfunction in electronic stock transactions, EFITA should be ex-
tended to make the bank strictly liable where such loss is due to
bank error.
In short, several factors point to the regulation of bank error or
malfunction in electronic stock trading under the provisions of
EFTA. Although it initially appears that EFTA was not intended
to regulate electronic stock transactions, the lack of regulation of
banks by the SEC combined with the flexibility of EFTA support
the notion of potential regulation under EFTA. Additionally, the
factual similarity of the electronic stock transaction to the elec-
tronic funds transfer is an important supporting factor. Further-
more, the burden of proof should be on the bank since potential
damages due to error or malfunction are foreseeable at the time of
contracting. Finally, the bank is better able to bear the loss through
cost spreading. The intent of EFTA was to allow flexibility in de-
termining whether new electronic services should be covered by the
act. Accordingly the coverage of EFTA should be extended to
cover electronic stock transactions and, in the case of error or mal-
function, banks should be held strictly liable.
B. Liability Under Contract Principles
If strict liability is not available under the provisions of EFTA,
104. 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9416.
105. See supra note 92.
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an attorney seeking recovery for loss through error or malfunction
in an electronic stock transaction will have to argue by necessity
that recovery is available under contract principles.
Unlike most bank transactions which involve debit and credit
matters, an electronic stock transaction inevitably involves the issue
of potential profits. Error or malfunction in an electronic stock
transaction therefore necessarily will involve loss of profits. Lost
profits have traditionally not been allowed under contract principles
unless they were within contemplation of the parties at the time
they entered into the contract."°6 The rule may be simply stated
that lost profits must be foreseeable to be recoverable.10 7
However, unlike traditional bank matters in which lost profits
arise as a consequence of an error or malfunction, 0 ' lost profits in
an electronic stock transaction are a direct result of the error. Be-
cause the investor orders the bank to sell at a certain price, both
parties are on notice as to the amount of profit which might be lost.
Loss of profit in electronic stock transactions is therefore foresee-
able, and as a result, the damages resulting from an error or mal-
function in electronic stock transactions should be recoverable
under contract principles.
Even if a contract allocates the liability of error to the investor,
such a provision should not be recognized, as it would be against
public policy. 0 9 Although waivers of rights and disclaimers of
damages are allowed under contract principles as a recognition of
the parties rights to allocate the risks of the contract, the National
Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers viewed as unequal the
bargaining power between EFT providers and most customers.110
It therefore rejected private contract as an appropriate vehicle for
establishing rights and liabilities and concluded that the rights and
liabilities of the parties should be governed by statute"1 so as to
provide uniform rules for all electronic fund transactions.' The
underlying policy was to provide maximum protection for the con-
sumer while maintaining sound business practices which will benefit
106. FARNSWORTH, CoNmrAcrs, § 12.14, at 878 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
FARNSWORTH].
107. Lost profits are one form of consequential damages, and consequential damages are
usually not recoverable unless they were foreseeable at the time the parties entered into the
contract. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
108. See eg., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
109. FARNswoRTH, supra note 106 at 335.
110. FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 55.
I11. Id
112. Id.
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the public at large. 113
Liability allocation in electronic stock transactions must begin
with the fact that the bank has a greater bargaining position and if
allowed to contractually allocate their liablity, will, through excul-
patory clauses, effectively disclaim liability for error or malfunc-
tion. 14 While bargaining may be an effective procedure between
merchants acting at arm's length, the majority of users of electronic
stock trading will be consumers who have neither the time nor the
sophistication to negotiate a contract with a bank.
Although users of an electronic stock trading system likely are
somewhat more sophisticated than users of EFT in general, it is
unfair to assume that they would understand the impact of a liabil-
ity limitation clause in the event of an error on the part of the bank,
or if they did understand that they could strike a better bargain
elsewhere. For the same reasons set forth by the Commission on
Electronic Fund Transfers, disclaimers and waivers should not be
allowed in electronic stock transactions.115 To allow such exculpa-
tory clauses would be to allow the bank to contract away its liability
for error or malfunction and to impose on the investor a burden
which he did not bargain for. Such an imposition would be against
public policy.
V. CONCLUSION
Several factors point to the conclusion that bank liability for
error or malfunction in electronic stock transactions should be
strictly imposed under the EFTA. Error inevitably will cause dam-
ages which were within the contemplation of both the bank and the
investor at the time of contracting. The bank is on notice that any
error will cause loss to the investor, and should be held strictly lia-
ble for its error. Since EFTA already imposes strict liability on
banks for error or malfunction in electronic funds transfers-a
transaction factually similar to electronic stock transactions-it is
logical to extend its coverage to electronic stock transactions.
Nevertheless, if the courts fail to extend EFTA protection to
electronic stock transactions, it may be strongly argued that com-
mon law contract principles should be applied to protect investors.
In order to provide such protection a court must be convinced that
the damages were foreseeable at the time the initial contract was
113. Id
114. See supra note 94.
115. FINAL REPORT, supra note 26 at 55.
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entered into and any contractual limitation of the bank's liability
was contrary to public policy.
Electronic stock trading by banks is likely to eventually domi-
nate the discount brokerage business and may become the standard
method by which stocks are traded. The efficiency and capability
offered by electronic stock trading are attractive features to any seri-
ous investor. The service may well become indispensible. Banks
have the assets and network capability to dominate this service and
become "the only game in town." The investor will be forced to
play by the bank rules unless a means can be developed to assure
investors of recovery in the event of bank error or malfunction.
